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                                1. Introduction  
 
  When we look at the Soviet Union and the Japanese empire, it is striking that  
both states sought to find recognition with the Western powers around the Russo-
Japanese war of 1904-05, but two decades later, had constructed an ideology that 
made it possible to create “occupational legitimacy” without the recognition of these 
Western powers. Russia and Japan were continually frustrated with the imperialistic 
hypocrisy of the West that accumulated during the Versailles negotiations in 1919. 
We can observe a breaking point for the Russians when Europe and the United States 
intervened in its Civil War (1917-1922) by supporting the “whites1”. The Japanese 
government rejected the West when it refused to recognize Japanese occupation in 
Manchuria. Subsequently in February 1933, Japan left the League of Nations2. Given 
these historical circumstances, it is remarkable how little academic attention has been 
paid to these two empires and their similarities. Rather, Japan has often been 
compared to Nazi and fascist regimes of Germany and Italy during the 1930s due to 
their common fascist state structure3. In a different context, Susan C. Townsend 
already shows how valuable comparative studies are when one looks at repressive 
measures in “mainland” Japan in the 1930s and the Soviet regime of Brezhnev in 
1964. When we look at the Manchukuo state of 1932-1945, Japanese state-builders 
were not only informed by their own colonial experiments with nationality, but also 
by Chinese Republican and Soviet ideas and challenges4.  
  What is more, it would be too simplistic to refer to the Soviet Union as 
“communist” and the Japanese empire as “fascist”, and therefore ideological 
opposites. Apart from the fact that ideology is easily oversimplified and 
overstereotyped, it is also impossible to give a single definition of “an ideology”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The whites were anti-Bolshevik supporters of the former Tsarist government, landowners and 
generals 
2 Townsend, Susan C. (2000) “ Manchuria: a ‘slighter Gesture of Dissent’?” in Yanaihara Tadao and 
Japanese Colonial Policy: Redeeming Empire, ed. Susan C. Townsend, p. 158-188, esp. 158. UK: 
Curzon Press 
3 Townsend, Susan C. (2000) “Afterword” in Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy: 
Redeeming Empire, ed. Susan C. Townsend, p. 257-275, esp. 269. UK: Curzon Press 
4 Duara, Prasenjit (2003) “Conclusion” in Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East 
Asian Modern, ed. Prasenjit Duara, p. 245-255, esp.252. US: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers 
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Ideologies themselves have an inherently dialectical character, while complex social 
processes means that “ideologies overlap, compete and clash, drown or reinforce each 
other”5. This means that “communism” would not just only be “communism” since in 
the Soviet Union, for example, we can find characteristics of nationalism and 
imperialism too. In the colonial context, Japan used ideologies like Asianism to make 
an appeal to the societies they occupied. As Ethan Mark shows, Asianism in the 
interwar period used Marxist-Leninist critiques of Western capitalism and 
imperialism6. Although this discussion refers to quite a number of ideas and 
ideologies, it is important to remember that they are multi-faceted in nature.    
  In this dissertation I will conduct a comparative analysis between the Soviet 
Union and Manchukuo in relation to ethnic policies, mainly but not exclusively, in 
the interwar period. Both colonial powers, Japan and the Soviet Union constructed 
policies to win support for their government in the territories they “occupied”. 
Furthermore, Japan and the Soviet Union both sought ways to deal with the 
multinational or multicultural nature of their empire in which they were forced to 
acknowledge and foster ethnic minority rights7. One can argue that the creation of a 
multinational policy was almost unrealistic when one considers trends at the time: the 
disintegration of the multinational Habsburg and Ottoman empires and the rise of 
ethnically driven nationalism8. Moreover, during the interwar period, the idea of 
national self-determination preached by President Woodrow Wilson and Lenin’s 
appeal to anti-colonialism, made it harder and harder for imperial powers to justify 
their domination9. At the same time, there was a need to survive and compete in the 
capitalist world- or, as in the case of the Soviet Union, to be economically 
competitive with capitalism. This meant the maximization of territory of the state in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Decker, James M (2004) “Introduction to ‘Ideology’ “ in Ideology, ed. Julian Wolfreys, p. 3-14, esp. 
5. US: Palgrave Macmillan 
6 Mark, Ethan (2006), “Asia's Transwar Lineage: Nationalism, Marxism, and ‘Greater Asia’ in an 
Indonesian inflection.” The Journal of Asian Studies 65(3), p.461-493 , esp. 464 and Matsuura: 2013:3 
7 Duara, 2003: 252 
8 Huttenbach, Henry R (1990) “Introduction: Towards a Unitary Soviet State: Managing a 
Multinational Society, 1917-1985” in Soviet Nationality Policies, Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR, 
ed. Henry R. Huttenbach,p. 1-8, esp. 1. US: Mansell Publishing Limited 
9 Zarrow, Peter (2005) “Nationalism and Revolution, 1919-1937” in China in War and Revolution, 
1895-1949, ed. Peter Zarrow, p. 149-169, esp. 155. US: Routledge	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order to access resources and markets; building a military and security system; and 
imperial claims upon territories and people10. In addition, the increasing international 
tension and protectionism during the Great Depression heightened the appeals of 
notions of imperial autarky and self-sufficiency, a world carved up into exclusive 
“blocs”. 
  Manchukuo and the Soviet Union are reflective of a trend where in the inter-
war period older colonial relationships in many parts of the world were formed by 
experiments in limited political or electoral representation, nationalist forms and 
developmental agendas, as the discourse of a supranational brotherhood. Although 
this trend opposed traditional imperialist forms, it also had the potential to develop 
into new modes of domination. In Manchukuo, Pan-Asianism, imperial citizenship, 
and multi-nationalism were all Japanese expressions of these political forms. In the 
Soviet Union, sovereignty claims were made upon regions and groups with weak 
links to the center, and subsequently developed similar political policies11.  
  As Foucault has argued, in order for a government to strengthen itself, it uses 
techniques and practices that seek to define, regulate, control, mobilize, and expand 
the capacities of its most basic source of power: bio- power, or what came to be 
called “population”. Governmentality, which signifies improvement, increase of 
wealth, health and the welfare of the population become the major goals of the 
government12. The two faces of Manchukuo, both repressive and developmental, 
were expressed by many modern non-democratic states, like fascist Italy, Nazi 
Germany, and the Stalinist Soviet Union13. Through politics of improvement, a 
strategy of persuasion was implemented in order to make (imperial) dominance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Duara,	  Prasenjit	  (2003)	  “Imperialsim	  and	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Twentieh	  Century”	  in	  
Sovereignty	  and	  Authenticity,	  Manchukuo	  and	  the	  East	  Asian	  Modern,	  ed.	  Prasenjit	  Duara,	  p.	  9-­‐40,	  esp.17.	  US:	  Rowan	  and	  Littlefield	  Publishers	  11	  Duara, Prasenjit (2003) “Introduction” in Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East 
Asian Modern, ed. Prasenjit Duara, p. 1-6, esp.1-2. US: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers 12	  Duara,	  2003:	  24	  13	  Duara, Prasenjit (2003) “Manchukuo: a Historical Overview” in Sovereignty and Authenticity, 
Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, ed. Prasenjit Duara, p. 41-86, esp.72. US: Rowan and 
Littlefield Publishers 
	   8	  
acceptable, and even desirable14.    
  As we shall see, crises, whether domestic, international or both, determined to 
a great deal the creation, shift, or break away from ethnic policies. Therefore, 
important question to keep in mind are: what did the Soviet Union want from its non-
Russians? What did the Manchukuo state want from the non-Japanese? What did the 
state need them for? But also, what kind of internal and domestic forces challenged 
the state in such a degree that it needed to secure the loyalty of the peoples?  
  Regarding the Soviet Union I will deal with the 1920-1930s, whereas for the 
Japanese I will make a distinction between pre- and post 1937. The distinction 
between these periods refers to a moment in time when such a crisis occurred, that it 
affected the state in its treatment of the “ethnically different population”. As we shall 
see, the Manchukuo state and the Soviet Union seem to have almost gone in opposite 
directions. The Soviet Union made large concessions to their non-Russian population 
in the 1920s, whereas the 1930s came to represent a stricter approach. On the other 
hand, while Japanese were able to have more privileges than the non-Japanese 
population, such acts became increasingly intolerable after 1937, even though 
violence against the population persisted. The concessions the Manchukuo state and 
the Soviet Union made were mostly practically informed- what worked rather than 
what was from an ideological standpoint “the right thing to do”. What is more, 
whatever compromise and concessions they made, it would never compromise their 
power.  
          Finally I would like to clarify why, from all the territories in the Japanese 
empire, I chose Manchukuo to be compared to the Soviet Union. Like in the Soviet 
Union, Manchukuo constituted a contradiction between alliance based on nominal 
independence and the imperialist power structure. In Korea and Taiwan, Japan forged 
policies based on assimilation and exclusion. This would have different implications 
for identity projects, when especially from the 1930s onwards, the imperialization or 
kominka movements in the colonies sought to make imperial Japanese subjects out of 
the colonized. These kinds of projects were officially rejected in Manchukuo. 
Manchukuo was a reflection of global imperialism in the inter-war years, in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Guha, Ranajit (1998) “Colonialism in South Asia, A Dominance without Hegemony and its 
Historiography “in Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, ed. Ranajit 
Guha, p. 1-94, esp. 34. US: Oxford University Press 
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direct rule and exploitation by an outside force gave way to indirect rule, 
collaborative arrangements with local elites, self-government, quasi independence, 
and other means to secure imperialist interests15. As we shall see, the Soviet 
government implemented similar policies.  
         Although this is a comparative study, the main focus will be on Manchukuo due 
to a lack of proficiency in Russian as well as length constraints. I hope that despite 
this, I can offer new and valuable insights concerning ethnic policies created by both 
states. In the Soviet case, ethnic policies may be less complex than they seem, since 
the creation of the Soviet state and the establishment of power was much more 
chaotic than in the case of Manchukuo. What is more, the Soviet Union covered a 
larger territory with many more ethnic groups. Readers who want to have broader 
background knowledge, may refer to A Vision Unfulfilled, Russia and the Soviet 
Union in the Twentieth Century (1996)16, and The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations 
and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-193917. Regarding Manchukuo, they may 
refer to Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(1998)18 and Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern 
(2003)19. The latter two, offer us valuable insights concerning the interaction between 
“mainland” and “empire”, and the questions of nationalism and modernity in relation 
to Manchukuo.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Duara, 2003: 246-247 
16 Thompson, John M. (1996) A Vision Unfulfilled, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. John M. Thompson, US: D.C. Heath and Company 
17 Martin, Terry (2001) The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939. US: Cornell 
18 Young, Louis (1998) Japan’s Total Empire, Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, ed. 
Louis Young. US: University of California Press 
19 Duara, Prasenjit (2003) Sovereignty and Authenticity, Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, ed. 
Prasenjit Duara. US: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers	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                            2. A Soviet Glimpse  
  One of the ways the Bolsheviks established power and prevented the 
dissolution of the multinational empire was to find a balance between force and 
concession. As we shall see, in the short and long term, these measures proved to be 
successful20. This chapter will focus on the nationality policies the Soviet Union 
enforced towards its ethnic minority population. The first half of the chapter will 
focus on the consolidation of Soviet power during the 1920s, and its subsequent 
concessions in nationality policy. The 1920s will cover the subthemes Reflections on 
Nationalism, State Structure and Uneasiness. The second half of this chapter will 
focus on the 1930s, which reflects a turning point in the nationality policy of the 
Soviet Union. The 1930s symbolize a step back in the concessions it made towards its 
ethnic minority population. This was partly due to domestic and international unrest 
and pressure, but also by disappointments in the results of its implementation during 
the 1920s. The 1930s will cover the subthemes Turning Point and Revision and 
Rehabilitation.  
2.1 The 1920s  
 
  Reflections on Nationalism The Soviet Union was the first empire in which a 
positive nationality policy was implemented. The new government was the first of the 
old European multi-ethnic states to deal with nationalism in such a way. The Soviet 
government promoted the national consciousness of the ethnic non-Russian 
minorities, and established for them institutional forms of a nation state21. It is 
therefore even more interesting to note that when the Bolsheviks came to power in 
1917, they had not yet formulated a nationality policy. There was a slogan that 
propagated the rights of nations to self-determination, but this slogan was created to 
recruit ethnic support for the socialist revolution, not to provide a model for the 
governing of a multi-ethnic state. Lenin and Stalin were greatly surprised and 
disturbed by the unexpected strength of nationalism as a mobilizing force during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Simon, Gerard (1991)” Introduction” in Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the 
Soviet Union, ed. Gerard Simon, p. 1-19, esp. 2. US: Westview Press 
21 Martin, Terry (2001) “The Soviet Affirmative Action Empire” in The Affirmative Action Empire, 
Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, p. 1-27, esp. 1. US: Cornell University Press 
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Revolution and the Civil War. The collapse of the Habsburg Empire made even 
bigger impressions. Lenin and Stalin understood that it was dangerous to be viewed 
by their population as an empire. This confrontation with nationalism made the 
Bolsheviks formulate a new nationalities policy, which was implemented in the 
constitution of 1923. Their ultimate goal was to “assume leadership over what 
appeared to be the inevitable process of decolonization and carry it out in a manner 
that would preserve the territorial integrity of the Old Russian Empire” 22.  
  Nationalism among the ethnic minorities was thus the driving force in the 
creation of the nationality policy. Initially, Lenin called nationalism a “bourgeois 
trick”, in which it had the potential to forge above class alliances23 in the pursuit of 
national goals24. This meant that it had the potential to undermine the “communist” 
goal of a world revolution in which all proletariat would be united. Thus the 
Bolsheviks regarded nationalism as a masking ideology. Even though the Soviet 
government eventually adopted a policy to encourage nationalism, they remained 
highly suspicious of it25. Despite seeing nationalism as a threat, Lenin and Stalin also 
argued that by granting the ethnic minorities forms of nationhood, the Soviet state 
could split the above-class national alliance for statehood. By taking autonomy from 
the national bourgeoisie, nationalism would eventually transform into Soviet 
autonomy. Class division would then naturally emerge which would allow the Soviet 
government to recruit proletarian and peasant support for their socialist agenda26. 
Stalin argued that nationalism in the Soviet Union would be “national in form, 
socialist in content”, but did not elaborate on the exact meaning. This was intentional, 
since the Bolshevik plans for transformation of the country did not allow 
characteristic religious, legal, ideological, or customary outlooks that could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Martin, 2001:1- 2 and 19-20 
23 According to communist rhetoric, class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie would 
occur over the unequal distribution of means of production.  The political, social, and economic 
conflict between the two classes would lead to a revolution and the subsequence establishment of a 
communist state with public ownership of the means of production. However, above class alliances 
would signify an opposite trend in which class struggle did not take place. Consequently, no 
communist revolution, let alone establishment of a communist state, was secured 
24 Martin, 2001: 4 
25 Martin, 2001: 4 
26 Martin, 2001: 5	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undermine Soviet sovereignty27. 
  Lenin also saw non-Russian nationalism as a response to Tsarist oppression 
and therefore he further stimulated distrust of the “Great Russians”. Lenin argued that 
nationalism of the oppressed had a “democratic content”, in which national 
grievances could be expressed and therefore needed support. By granting ethnic 
minorities a degree of autonomy and self-expression, Soviet power would seem 
“native”, “intimate”, “popular”, and “comprehensible”. In this way, non-Russians 
would look at Soviet power and her organs as the product of their own efforts and 
desires. Negative association with foreign rule would be disarmed as native languages 
would make Soviet power understandable and national cadres who “understood “the 
way of life, customs, habits of the local population”, would make Soviet power seem 
indigenous rather than an external Russian imperial force. Nationalism of the 
oppressor, in other words where the Russians were referred to as Great Power 
Chauvinists, had to be actively discouraged28. As Terry Martin shows, it is precisely 
this step that preserved the national structure of an old empire. Although the Soviet 
Union rejected the idea of a state bearing people, the Russians remained so in a way. 
Only Russians were not granted their own territory and their own Communist Party. 
Rather, the party asked the Russians to accept a formally unequal national status to 
promote unity of the multinational state. The hierarchal distinction between state 
bearing and colonial peoples was thus “reproduced, but reversed, as the new 
distinction between the formerly oppressed nationalities and the former great-power 
nation. Russians were now literally asked to bear the burden of empire by suppressing 
their national interest and identifying with a non-national affirmative empire.” Martin 
calls this ironically the “highest stage of Imperialism29” 30. In this light, it is therefore 
important to stress that the nationality policy was never an independent Bolshevik 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Martin, 2001: 12-13 
28 Martin, 2001: 6-12 
29  The “highest state of imperialism” signifies a condition where it is not the center that suppresses the 
periphery, but rather itself. It denies itself privileges like a party and territory, to not inflame anti-
Russian sentiments but also to preserve the status quo.  In this way, it maintains the structure of an 
empire, while proclaiming its not. The irony is that denial of the existence of an empire is the highest 
form of developing one 
30 Martin, 2001: 19-20	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goal and many regarded it as a “temporary if necessary evil” 31. By creating this 
policy it sought to prevent the emergence of anti-Russian nationalism and thereby 
concentrate on other goals like industrialization, nationalization of the means of 
production, abolition of the market, collectivization of agriculture, and the creation of 
socialism (abroad)32. 
  State Structure The party was structured in such a way that it had the ability to 
re-educate, transform and modernize the Soviet citizen. Although the revolution 
represented a unitary people, the socialist construction recognized their weaknesses. 
The state became all knowing and an educator that would “lead people out of the 
darkness into which their continued attachments to the old order and its norms had 
cast them” 33. Goal rationality, like the fusion of a multi-ethnic Soviet identity by the 
promotion of nationalism or economic reforms such as the NEP, served as a way to 
legitimate the party’s activities34. It was thanks to the Party that “new nationalities 
were created out of tribes that had earlier never dreamed of national existence and 
who transferred in just six years through all the stages of development, which for 
other peoples required thousands of years”35. It was under this kind of rhetoric that 
modernization campaigns were started in all national territories: transportation was 
modernized, public health systems were established, agriculture was mechanized and 
the economy industrialized36.  
  Within the Soviet system, political governance was based on the following 
principles. First and foremost the supportive principle of the autonomy of a national 
territory that represented a governmental structure. This governmental structure was 
divided in spheres of competence between federal and republic jurisdiction, but was 
clearly in favor of the federal. Secondly, a cadres policy where local positions were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Martin, 2001: 20 
32 Martin, 2001: 20 
33 Robinson, Neil (1995) “The Origins of Soviet Ideology and the Power of the Party” in Ideology and 
the Collapse of the Soviet System, p. 31-63, esp. 31. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Company 
34 Robinson, Neil (1995) “ Bringing Ideology Back In: Ideology and the Party in the Soviet Model of 
Politics” in Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System, p. 1-30, esp. 23. UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company 
35 Martin, Terry (2001) “The Reemergence of the Russians” in The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations 
and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, p. 394-431, esp. 402. US: Cornell 
36 Simon, 1991: 4	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opened up to ethic minorities while important and influential positions were reserved 
within the republics for Russians and other Slavs. The non-Slavic role within the 
republics in the federal apparatus was limited while non-Russians were not 
represented in the Party in proportion to their representation in the total population37. 
Finally, a wide gap existed between the constitutional rights of a union republic 
within the federal system and the freedom to exercise those rights in “reality”38. In a 
way, these principles were reflective of Lenin’s opinion that “national demands were 
subordinate to the interests of the class struggle as far as the proletariat was 
concerned”39.  
  The Soviet government also divided its population between the eastern and 
western nationalities. This distinction referred not as much to the geographic aspect 
as the developmental. The majority of the Soviet ethnic minorities were judged to be 
culturally backward. The western “advanced” nationalities consisted of Ukrainians, 
Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Germans, and of course, the Russians40. Like Takashi 
Fujitani has shown in his research, and as we shall see in the next chapter, this type of 
“neo colonial racism” demonstrates that even though the Soviet Empire rejected 
racism and the hierarchy of races, this did not mean that racism disappeared. “Neo 
colonial racism” or “inclusionary racism” did not stress the essential inferiority of the 
eastern nationalities but rather their cultural and historical backwardness41. What is 
more, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism rested on the theory that the rights and status of a 
nationality group did not depend on ideals like democracy and equality, but rather on 
an order of preference by factors such as location, size, stability, and the dominance 
in the area by a nationality group. Stalin arranged the Soviet nationalities 	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hierarchically based on their recognition. Recognition was expressed through the 
right to a separate flag, a republic anthem, and written constitution42. 
  When it came to economic policies, these were decided by the Party on a 
federal level. This resulted in the implementation of a non-equal economic 
development policy, and therefore many national and autonomous regions suffered 
from economic inequality43. While not all national minorities faced the same situation 
throughout the USSR, most of them were unable to protect themselves as they were 
economically weak, and represented by political elites who depended on the central 
government. Furthermore, most regions had a population that was no longer 
dominated by agriculture, but also had not yet produced a proletariat. Although they 
were no longer illiterate, most of the populace in non-Russian regions were not 
universally educated. It was under these circumstances that Stalin could expand the 
command economy44 in accordance with a military model45. 
  The right to autonomy in the non-Russians territories was subject to two 
requirements: the issue of the state’s unity was not open to discussion, and the 
autonomous republic had to recognize the central party leadership’s monopoly on 
power. Although this meant that no political self-determination could be granted, the 
impact on the nationalities policy should not be underestimated. All citizens were 
equal before law and permitted linguistic autonomy and as such non-Russian 
language literature and media was on the rise46. National elites were trained and 
promoted to leadership positions in governments, schools, and industry in their new 
territories. In these territories, the national language was declared the official 
language of the government and in most cases this made the creation of a written 
language necessary if one did not yet exist. However, in the technical, agricultural, 
and economic fields, ethnic minorities remained underrepresented. This can be partly 	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blamed on the fact that it took time to translate educational books into national 
languages and therefore most of the courses were taught in Russian. As a result, it 
was mostly Russians who occupied specialist positions. Furthermore, the educational 
standards in the non-Russian territories were extremely low, especially if they did not 
have a national script before integration into the Soviet Union47. Despite these 
setbacks, the Soviets did make genuine efforts to integrate non-Russians into 
technical schools and colleges. Non-Russians got preferential treatment when it came 
to enrollment. Based on a quota system, the faculties had to open up spots for non-
Russian nationals in their own and Russian territories. The standard for the entrance 
exams was even lowered for the applicants48. Furthermore, the Soviet state financed 
and promoted the production of books, journals, newspapers, movies, operas, 
museums, and folk music ensembles in the non-Russian languages49. Hence, the 
Soviet government devoted considerable resources to the promotion of national self-
consciousness of its non-Russian population. Assimilation policies were even 
strongly discouraged50. However, this does not mean that there was no surveillance 
from the government concerning its implementation. When deemed necessary, 
suppressive or violent measures were taken to prevent the development of a type of 
national self-consciousness that could have separatists’ tendencies51.  
  Uneasiness Towards the end of the 1920s, there was a growing uneasiness 
with the nationality policy and the national self-consciousness that it had promoted. 
The introduction of national languages developed national identities, but 
simultaneously differentiated nations from each other52. People became more loyal to 
their own “nation”, which blocked the path to a unitary state and society, and 
weakened Soviet patriotism. In this regard, no fusion of nationalities could evolve 
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with Homo Sovieticus53 as its end goal54. A new strategy was proposed, where the 
Brotherhood of the Peoples was promoted. This campaign sought to actively foster a 
more multi-ethnic unity. One of the ways of doing this was by visits of non-Russian 
delegations to Moscow. This city did not represent the capital of Russia, but rather 
characterized the center of the proletarian revolution55. The Brotherhood of the 
People was the ideal symbol for the Cultural Revolution, which had started in 1928 
and lasted until 1931. The goal of the revolution was to create international 
proletarian solidarity against internal class enemies and the Great-Power 
Chauvinists56. Although the Brotherhood of the Peoples stands for an intimate family 
tie, according to communist theory it was strongly associated with class militancy. It 
did not try to portray domestic affection, but rather public solidarity. From this period 
onwards, the actions in the Soviet Union towards ethnic groups varied from 
establishing, reviving, encouraging, preserving, recognizing, tolerating and nullifying 
nationalities on the one hand. On the other, nationalities faced internal exile, 
resettlement, assimilation, expulsion and genocide57. Although the number of 
disciplinary measures against non-Russian functionaries suspected of “local 
nationalism” increased considerably after 1927, at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 
1930, Stalin continued to propagate that Great Russian Chauvinism was the main 
threat to the Party concerning the nationalities question. Nevertheless, this standpoint 
was officially abandoned in late 1933. Stalin declared that the dispute over the “main 
threat” was “formal” and “pointless”. As a consequence, the media dealt less and less 
with the threat of Russian nationalism, and more often portrayed the dangers of “local 
nationalism”, which was now referred to as “bourgeois nationalism”58. 
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2.2 The 1930s 
 
   Turning Point The 1930s were increasingly dominated by fear, unrest, 
anxiety and the prospect of war. None of the great promises made during the 
enthusiastic period (1928-1932) of the First Five-Year-Plan were kept. These 
included the development of socialism, the elimination of classes, a solution to the 
nationalities issues, and the surpassing of capitalism59. Revolutionary enthusiasm 
within the Party had died out, while collectivization and famine had destroyed all 
revolutionary spirit60. Furthermore, the emigration movements dramatically 
confronted the Soviet government with failure of the Piedmont Principle. According 
to this principle, the western national minorities ought to be attractive communist 
examples for their ethnic counterparts beyond the Soviet Union. However, they (for 
examples, Germans and Poles) had been attracted by their respective “home” 
countries, and had rejected the Soviet fatherland in an embarrassing way. 
Additionally, the non-Russian territories offered more violent resistance to 
collectivization than the Russian center. Such resistance was strongest in the border 
regions61. This was at a time when Hitler openly threatened with foreign intervention 
in order to separate Ukraine from the Soviet Union62. The emigration of non-Russian 
minorities and uprisings worried the government about the loyalty of the non-Russian 
periphery as well as the security of the border regions63. All in all, the gap between 
the revolutionary utopia and reality was huge. Stalin’s solution was to replace “reality” 
with an “illusion”. This meant not developing socialism, but declaring it developed64. 
Consequently, this also affected the nationality policy. Whereas in the 1920s Lenin 
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and Stalin created these policies to confront separatist forms of nationalism, in 1933 
Stalin stated that the policies had failed: 
“I spoke about the vitality of the vestiges of capitalism. One should note that the 
vestiges of capitalism are much more vital in the realm of nationalities policy than in 
any other area. They are more vital because they have the possibility to mask 
themselves very effectively in a national costume” 65.   
Stalin enforced a nationality policy that assumed the Soviet Union had already 
entered the phase of national assimilation. The “unreliable” periphery had convinced 
Stalin that Russians and Russification were more reliable ways of establishing 
authority than the national elites66. As we shall see, despite repressive measures 
against separatist movements, the nationality policy kept on promoting national 
identity67. 
  Revision & Rehabilitation Between 1933 and 1938, the status of the Russian 
nationality in the RSFSR68 was raised considerably. For the ethnic Russians, this was 
good news. Most Russians party members resented the fact that they had to make 
sacrifices for the ethnic minority population69. This meant that ethnic minorities in 
the Russian Regions of the RSFSR had to accustom themselves to a Russian 
environment. On the other hand, ethnic Russians could finally feel at home in their 
own republic70. Nevertheless, this move threatened the foundations of the Soviet 
nationality question in which Russians suppressed their national self-expression in 
order not to inflame unrest among the non-Russian population. Stalin was aware of 
this, and although Russian national self-expression was revived, this did not mean 
that non-Russian national self-expression was being disregarded. Actually, the 
promotion of non-Russian identity was reinforced after 193371. The strategic 
rehabilitation of Russian culture and nationality was used to emphasize the unifying 
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core of the Soviet Union72. This is what Russian sociologist Nicholas Timasheff 
called the “Great Retreat”: the gradual abandoning of revolutionary, utopian, social 
and cultural practices in favor of traditional, often pre-revolutionary beliefs73. The 
Great Retreat marked a new emphasis on Soviet citizens’ right to assimilate- the right 
to choose their own identity. At the same time, ethnic minority statutes in their own 
regions were promoted as well. The right to assimilate tried to tackle some practical 
problems. Apart from providing a home for the ethnic Russians through the 
Russification of the RSFSR, there was also a need to stabilize the number of 
nationalities and their territories to a manageable size. The majority of the Soviet 
nationalities were neither expected nor encouraged to assimilate. Rather, their 
nationhood was further secured and the deep historic roots of their ethnicity 
emphasized and celebrated. Nevertheless, we must also not forget that the Soviet 
government was in a position to make this move. Suppressing Russian nationality and 
reinforcing non-Russian nationalities in the 1920s was a measure taken to convince 
the non-Russian population to join the Soviet Union, despite the fact that nationalism 
was not compatible with the fundamental ideology of the Soviet Empire. After a 
decade of consolidating power and empire building, the Soviet Union was in a 
position to revive the Russian nationality. Rather than denouncing nationalism in 
general, the Soviet state could not get around the fact that nationalism is difficult to 
eradicate74.  
  Although non-Russian national self-expression kept on being promoted in the 
non-Russian territories, this did not mean than the ethnic minorities faced no 
repressive measures, especially in comparison with the 1920s. Beginning in the 1930s, 
institutions that had served ethnic minorities were gradually broken down. Ethnic 
minorities were no longer regarded as a group that was in need of protection and 
development because of their weakness75. Starting in 1933 and reaching its highest 
point in 1937-1938, ethnic cleansing and mass arrests and executions among the 
Soviet Union’s emigrants were preformed. They were considered to be disloyal 	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because of their national ethnicity alone76. The revival of Russian national self-
expression and the status of Russian culture as the unifying core, gave Russian 
culture a privileged status. In 1934, schools and mass media started introducing new 
views of history where apart from the history of the socio-economic base, they 
returned to the instruction of history of nation and states. Old heroes and personalities 
of Russian history were reintegrated. In practice this meant that Russian history 
became the history of the Soviet Union, and histories from the ethnic minorities were 
a mere prehistory of the integration into the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union77. 
Russian culture and Russian people were now regarded as “great”. Russian culture 
was the most “progressive culture” and was used to serve as a model for other Soviet 
nationalities. The reason why Russian culture was deemed so great was because it 
was linked to closeness with socialism and the dominant role of the Russian 
proletariat in the October revolution of 191778. The Russian language became 
important for everybody to participate in the “greatness” of Russian culture. Non-
Russians were demanded to express repeatedly and ritualistically their gratitude to the 
Russians for their “brotherly help”, as well as their esteem and love for Russian 
culture79. Anyone opposing this belief was portrayed as a bourgeois nationalist80. 
  This emphasis on Russian culture was expressed in the rhetoric of the 
Friendship of the Peoples, which was introduced by Stalin in 1935. The rhetoric, 
which displayed Soviet patriotism, was created at a time when revolutionary spirit in 
the Party had disappeared due to the disillusionment of all the unfulfilled promises 
and terror that had reigned with the start of the late 1920s. This new patriotism was 
created as a replacement for a revolutionary ideal that no longer existed. Apart from 
Soviet pride for the homeland, the Friendship of the Peoples was also related to the 
constant threat of war by “capitalist encirclement”. From 1936, Stalin’s personality 
cult became part of the Soviet patriotism represented by the Friendship of the 
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Peoples81. Russians, Russian culture and the RSFSR were to be the primary power 
that created and preserved that friendship82. Although the Russians became the center 
of the friendship, they were encouraged to identify with Soviet interests83. Russian 
and Soviet history were made to historically link all the people of the Soviet Union 
with each other84. Russian holidays, anniversaries and celebrations also became part 
of the rhetoric of the Friendship of the Peoples85. Stalin’s language policy made clear 
on March 13th 1933 that Russian classes in non-Russian schools were to become 
compulsory. Russian was regarded necessary for mutual contact and relationships 
among the peoples, the development of cadres in science and technology, and to 
create a more unitary military86. Native-language education did remain compulsory in 
non-Russian schools and Russian was only to remain a study subject. The goal was 
bilingualism, or as Terry Martin argues, “at most biculturalism”87.  
  The 1930s was a time when there was a turn away from the Soviet view that 
nations were modern constructs, towards an emphasis on the deep prehistoric roots of 
modern nations. We can see this turn clearly in the way people regarded the national 
exotic. During the 1920s, the excessive use of folklore was regarded as one of the 
crimes committed by both nationalists and especially Great-Power Chauvinists. With 
the Friendship campaign of 1935, this concern disappeared and the folkloric and the 
exotic were uncritically celebrated. This trend also affected the literary world. Where 
before new works about the revolution had been favored, there was now a renewed 
interest in the pre-revolutionary “classics” that were devoted to folkloric themes. The 
purpose was to stress the depth and the historicity of the national culture88. Where in 
the 1920s Brotherhood of the People had stood for international proletarian solidarity 
against internal class enemies and Great-Power Chauvinists, the Friendship of the 	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People emphasized the nationalities “feeling of love” for each other. The emotions 
that were being stressed were now intimate and personal89.  The Great Retreat that 
introduced the Friendship of the Peoples was characterized by Stalin’s display of 
affection through paternal concern towards the common people, and the people’s 
gratitude and love for him90.  Purposely, the Friendship of the Peoples was not only 
portrayed as strong, but also as “indestructible” and “eternal”. The purpose of this 
was to discourage separatists from dreaming of a future91.  
  All in all, Soviet nationality policies during the 1920s and 1930s tended to be 
full of contradiction. Not only regarding ideas themselves, but also with regards to 
the “daily reality” 92. For example, regardless of the fact that Marxist-Leninist dogma 
states that nationalism is a “bourgeois trick”, nationalities were acknowledged. At the 
same time, the subsequent nationality policy did not lead to a fusion of nationalities 
in which above-class national alliance could be split for statehood. The “Great 
Retreat” of the 1930s marked pre-revolutionary practices in which there was a turn 
away from the Soviet view that nations were modern constructs, towards an emphasis 
on the deep prehistoric roots of modern nations. This again went against fundamental 
Marxist-Leninist beliefs. The Soviet Union was not alone in these kinds of 
contradictions. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Manchukuo state seems to 
have been almost a “champion” in this.  
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                         3. The Manchukuo Experiment 
The Manchukuo state presents us with two faces. Although cruel violence was 
used against its subjects, Manchukuo was also a developmental state. While it 
ruthlessly killed and exploited people, the state also provided high levels of 
investment, succeeded in state building, eliminated banditry, and controlled warlord 
armies by turning them into the Manchurian army93. Like the Soviet Union, the 
Manchukuo government tried to find a balance between coercion and concessions, 
the latter necessary for support for its regime. The conditions under which the 
Manchukuo state was formed differed from the Soviet Union and therefore present us 
with different outcomes. Nevertheless, like the Soviet Union, the Manchukuo 
government tried to see what worked practically and subsequently made concessions 
where necessary. The main part of this chapter will focus on the (contradictory) 
policies and institutions the Manchukuo state created in relation to the different ethnic 
groups during its consolidation of power. I will focus on the subthemes Formation, 
Discriminatory Difference, Sovereignty and Propaganda. 
  The final part of this chapter focuses on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war 
in 1937, and how this crisis shifted the attitude of the Manchukuo state towards their 
non-Japanese population. Although the Manchukuo state conducted a multi-ethnic 
policy in which all races were to be equal, that does not mean racism disappeared but 
rather that “it could operate even while being disavowed”. With this type of 
inclusionary racism” people would be incorporated into the hierarchical order rather  
than exterminated or excluded, which represents “exclusionary racism”. Inclusionary 
racism would stress the cultural or historical backwardness of the non-Japanese, but 
not their essential inferiority94. With the formation of the Manchukuo state in 1932, 
some sort of inclusion of the non-Japanese was necessary, and this certainly affected 
the institutions, policies and doctrines the Manchukuo state created. Nevertheless, 
after 1937, the need for inclusion became ever more demanding. 
    
3.1 Beginning and Mid-1930s  
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  Formation During the 1920s, Japan’s economic growth resulted in great 
achievements like the production of raw materials, the output of manufactured goods, 
technological advances and the diversification of its industries. By 1927, eighty-five 
percent of Japanese foreign investment was in China, and eighty percent of this was 
in Manchuria. The Japanese controlled the major coal and iron mines, foreign trading 
and shipping companies, electric supply, and railway lines. One of Japan’s major 
investments was the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMRC) or Mantetsu, 
which cost 440 million yen in 1920 alone95. Since economic expansion was its major 
goal, the Japanese government tried to protect its rights and interests in China. 
Moreover, it sought to increase export and provide further opportunities for 
investment96. Mainstream political parties also earnestly supported the expansion of 
the empire. Many parties saw it not only as the way to gain equality with the Western 
imperial powers, but also as a means to gain Western acquiescence in a special sphere 
of interest97. However, Japanese economic dominance in China was tested by the 
railway development of warlord Zhang Xueliang, who tried to compete with the 
SMRC, and by the denial of landownership to Japanese nationals. Many Chinese 
were discouraged and forbidden to lease lands to the Japanese, who used Koreans 
with Chinese citizenship in Manchuria for this purpose. Since the Koreans who 
worked on Japanese farms competed with Chinese farmers, the rivalry between the 
two groups sometimes escalated into violence98. 
  In 1927, General Tanaka Gichii took office as prime minister and pursued a 
firmer approach in foreign policy than in the years before. Three times in the period 
of 1927 and 1928, he sent troops to China, initially to protect Japanese citizens and 
economic interests. In the same period, the Nationalist army, led by charismatic 
leader Chiang Kaishek, had taken control of central China. The Japanese government 	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feared that Chiang Kaishek would expand his forces to Northern China and thereby 
threaten Japanese privileges99. In the period between 1929 and 1932, Japan faced 
severe economic depression, intense social conflicts, military expansion, and the 
assassination of prime ministers and leading capitalists. A combination of these 
factors led to a transformation of the political system in Japan. Independent political 
parties, business associations, producer cooperatives, labor unions, and tenant unions 
were replaced by a series of state-controlled mass bodies in order to bring “peace 
back at home”100. The reconstruction of the Japanese economy and society together 
with the perceived problem of a surplus rural population throughout the Japanese 
empire, gave rise to the slogan “Manchuria is our lifeline”101. Japan hoped to confront 
this problem through the emigration of Koreans and Japanese and their resettlement 
in Manchurian cooperative farms102. When we look specifically at Manchuria, the 
Kwantung army started to view their role not simply as defending Japanese interests. 
They anticipated the army as a group in the front line of the coming war between 
Japan and the West. They had a mission to build a model of a new society in the areas 
they occupied103.  
  Finally, partly due to Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, 
subsequent public pride soon led to the assumption that Japan should have a 
leadership role in Asia. Advocates of expansion used Japan’s success story in 
modernizing the country as an excuse to have a more active role in  “civilizing” the 
more “backward” Asian countries104. By harmonizing and incorporating Eastern and 
Western elements, they considered Japan to be in an outstanding position to help 
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China105. Many Japanese also believed they had a responsibility to “civilize” China 
not only because of the fact that it was a neighboring country, but also because of 
their intimate historical bonds. These ideas came together in the concept of dobun 
doshu, same culture and same race106. Moreover, the idea that “China is not a state 
but merely a civilization” became increasingly popular. By arguing that “being 
merely a civilization, it has no clearly delineated political borders”, the Japanese 
government could justify expansion and territorial conquest in China107. Despite the 
fact that Manchuria was overwhelmingly populated by Han- Chinese, and 
consequently “Sinicized”, it was the historical image of Manchuria as a frontier, a 
virgin land of “primitive” and hostile people unrelated to the Chinese that bolstered 
imperialistic claims to the area108. 
  On September 18, 1931, the Kwantung army blew up a part of the railway 
track of the southern Manchurian railway. They declared it was the work of Chinese 
military forces. This self-created incident was then used as an excuse to start 
attacking Chinese regional armies in the area109. Furthermore, according to a story 
circulated by Kwantung Army officers, Manchurian Chinese had grown tired of the 
continuing Chinese civil war and the accompanying destructions. During the 1920s, 
local Chinese had adopted the slogan hakyo amin, “secure the borders, pacify the 
people”. They demanded that Manchuria was to be separated from China, south of 
the Great Wall. In 1931 and 1932, Japanese military leaders claimed to be acting in 
name of this local independence movement110. By December 1931, Japanese forces 
controlled most of Southern Manchuria. The Kwantung army installed a government 	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that consisted of collaborators that included military and civilian elites. These people 
were attracted by the promise that their own positions would be secured, or even 
improved. On the long term, these promises were almost never honored, and the 
reality was that although only 469 out of the 1951 government officials in the 
Manchukuo government were Japanese, they took up all the important positions111. 
Within the police force, the indigenous people were underrepresented almost twenty 
to one112. Furthermore, large plots of lands were also forcibly confiscated from 
Chinese farms for Japanese settlers. Chinese who resisted were suppressed with 
extreme violence113. Nevertheless, the Japanese attracted enough allies to quell a 
possible resistance and the Japanese founded Manchukuo in 1932114. Most of the 
support came from the landed classes who promised loyalty in return for stability and 
the suppression of communism115. With the end of 1933, all “internal” resistance 
groups were “successfully” destroyed116. 
  Manchukuo was a formal independent nation. In Korea in 1919, Japan was 
faced with the Korean anti-colonial movement, in which groups in- and outside the 
regime began to rethink the nature of Japanese expansionism. Faced with the 
pressures offered by nationalism, the Japanese started adopting pan-Asianist 
ideologies117.  Rather than creating a colony, the discourse of pan-Asian liberation 
and anti-Western imperialism, and alternatively, the idea of national self-
determination propagated by Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, led to the decision to forge 
an independent nation-state that would “acknowledge and support its multi-ethnic 
nature”118. Through the denial of national self-determination on the one hand, and 	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acknowledgement of different ethnic groups –on Japanese conditions- on the other, 
the Japanese hoped that a multi-ethnic state would be a solution towards Japanese 
imperialism and Chinese nationalism 119. Furthermore, the proclamation of 
independence of Manchuria was initially meant to please the League of Nations and 
to fend off the claims of Chinese nationalists120. However, with the failure to get the 
recognition by the League, Japan played right into the hands of these nationalists121. 
What is more, despite the independent structure of the Manchukuo state, in practice 
the Japanese maintained full control over the territory122.  
  Discriminatory Difference Like Morris-Suzuki acknowledges, Japan, brought 
to its empire a variety complex and a self-contradictory mass of policies and 
institutions. These were based on a mix of human sentiments that included the desire 
of national power and prestige, the impulses of economic exploitation, the survival 
instincts of the colonial settler populations, bureaucratic fear and ignorance of its own 
subjects, genuine idealism, but also straightforward violence and greed. From the 
viewpoint of the colonized, even the most apparent “modernizing” institutions were 
heavily marked by discriminatory difference123.  
  For instance, unlike Germany, where many intellectuals fled or disassociated 
themselves from expansionist goals, many Japanese intellectuals actually supported 
the war by using their time, expertise and money. These intellectuals were 
(internationally) educated, well traveled, multilingual and cosmopolitan. Japanese 
scholars and China experts gathered to take up research and planning posts, as well as 
civilizing missions in the newly formed nation. Strongly influenced by left-wing 
ideas and often sympathetic to Japanese expansionistic ambitions, Manchukuo was 
perceived to be the solution to the tense Sino-Japanese relations. According to their 
logic, the Manchukuo state could both accommodate Japanese economic imperialism 
and Chinese nationalism. These intellectuals hoped to create a new society of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Young, 1998: 288 
120 Duara, 2003: 61 
121 Duara, 2003: 72 
122 Gordon, 2009: 187-188 
123 Morris-Suzuki, 1998: 103	  
	   30	  
“rightfulness” out of the chaos of twentieth century China124. Ironically, the civilizing 
mission turned liberals and radicals, who even supported Chinese nationalism and 
were not sympathetic to the army, into imperialists. This meant that by supporting the 
development of Manchukuo, they supported military action against Chinese 
nationalism. 
   The cooperative farms embody a second example of one of the self-
contradicting institutions created by the Manchukuo state. During the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese expressed their social and political 
discontent by attacking Koreans whom they believed to be assisting the Japanese for 
decades in penetrating Manchuria. The Manchukuo government feared that Korean 
refugees of the Chinese attacks would join anti-Japanese forces, who had previously 
led peasant uprisings in the Kando region125. As a solution, agrarian cooperatives 
were created to protect Korean refugees. Cooperatives were to establish security, 
protect people from bandits, promote collective rule, and provide services such as 
transportation, communication, and education126. It was believed that improvement in 
social life would be the ultimate means to discourage peasants from joining anti-
Japanese movements. The cooperatives were soon expanded as a means to repress 
anti-Japanese elements, and separate cooperatives were built for Korean and Chinese 
residents127. 
   According to Hyun Ok Park, people in the farms were placed into two 
categories: Manin and Japanese. Referring to the people of Manchukuo, the category 
Manin included Han Chinese, Manchu’s, and Mongols. The Japanese category 
consisted of Japanese and Koreans. This categorical distinction seemed to be 
designed to stress the Manchu origin of the Qing and Manchukuo state. It also sought 
to combine the ethnic principle of nation building with a territorial principle as the 
state sought to establish its sovereignty over the “Japanese” as well128. Since Japanese 
were at the top of the hierarchy, the Kwantung army defined the Japanese population 	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as model subjects capable of leading the colonization process in Manchuria. Japanese 
ought not only to defend their territory from the Soviet Union and participate in war 
in an emergency, but also claimed leadership in its “material and mental aspects”. 
The Japanese would teach agricultural techniques and management skill to the 
natives of Manchuria, setting an example to lead a stable and healthy life. By doing 
so, the Japanese would lay the foundation for Manchukuo and the East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere where modernity would flow from Japan to Manchukuo by the 
example the immigrants would set129.  
  Higher up in the ethnic hierarchy, people were believed to have higher and 
more expensive standards of living. Subsequently this was expressed in the amount of 
land and the terms of loans which were distributed130. Collective farms built for 
Chinese tenant differed from those for Koreans and Japanese peasants. Koreans were 
“second-class subjects”, situated between Chinese and Japanese nationals in which 
the Koreans had a considerable advantage compared to the Chinese when it came for 
instance to getting state-loans and larger plots of lands. These loans were used for 
housing, farm supplies, and collective facilities. This was to transforms tenants into 
independent cultivators. Furthermore, when Japanese immigrants fell short, Koreans 
were recruited to live in the (strategic) places meant initially for the Japanese131. This 
fueled Koreans with a new sense of superiority and contempt for the Chinese and 
often led to tensions between the two. However, even though Koreans and Japanese 
were put in the same category there were undoubtedly differences between them. 
Japanese cooperatives also offered loans, but the amounts and terms were much 
better than those offered to Korean peasants. Because Koreans were both registered 
in the Manchurian state register and in the Korean family register, and therefore had 
“dual nationality”, they had uncertain rights and faced discrimination, had to pay 
more taxes and had no legal protection. They were unable to join the Manchukuo 
army and were excluded from high-ranking administrative positions of the 
Manchukuo state132. In line with the hierarchy, Chinese peasants were the worst off. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Park, 2005: 136 
130 Park, 2005: 161 
131 Park, 2005: 141 
132 Park, 2005: 136-137 
	   32	  
Chinese cooperatives lacked the substantive mechanisms to improve living conditions 
since they had hardly any access to loans at all133. In general, the cooperatives trapped 
people into a life that came close to slavery, with practices like high rents and taxes, 
unpaid labor, and exploitation. Furthermore, the maximization of profits depended 
largely on the lengthening of hours of work in cultivation, construction of 
infrastructure such as housing, facilities, roads, and the organization of defense 
groups134.  
        The final example of the self-contradictory institutions the Manchukuo state 
created is represented by the Chinese mass political organization called the Kyowakai, 
or Concordia Association that was formed in July 1932. Its aim was to become the 
cornerstone of the newly formed state. The Concordia Association was part of the 
Kwantung Army, aimed to destroy resistance against the new regime, as well as to 
further spread its political control over society. The Concordia Association’s main 
purpose was to create propaganda and information gathering bureaus, as well as 
complete the network of so-called “peace and preservation committees” that 
organized cities, town and villages into neighborhood units. These units were 
collectively responsible for ensuring order within their district135. The association 
declared to be both anti-capitalist and anti-communist, and tried to overcome class 
and other divisions by organizing people through their communities. Although the 
Concordia Association was created to represent the different ethnic communities, it 
mainly sought the support of the elites of these ethnicities who represented them136. 
Through the association, people were integrated based on groups like occupation, 
ethnicity and religion, rather than as individuals. By giving different people and 
nationalities rights under a state structure, the Concordia Association saw itself as a 
nation in fashion of the Soviet Union of nationalities137. The Manchukuo state thus 
borrowed ideas of their (ideological) competitors in their search for legitimacy.  
  To promote solidarity, so-called “values of communalism” within religion 	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were emphasized. This was to celebrate Pan-Asianism, and to support the religious 
leadership among the people such as the Mongol lamas, the Manchu and Daur 
Shamans, Buddhist monks, and Confucian moralists138. Other techniques the 
association used to integrate people into the state structure were meetings, lectures 
and language classes; records and folksongs; theater and street performances; 
newspapers, literature and magazines; popular movements, sport events, arts and 
sciences and social interaction139. The Concordia Association was supposed to be two 
stages ahead of the old colonial ideas of the nineteenth century, and rejected 
bourgeois Western-style democracy in favor of a single party system where 
“ representatives truly express the opinions of the multitude; where councils come to 
a conclusion by unanimity; where people say frankly what they think of officials; 
where officials get people to understand what they intend to do; and where both the 
people and the officials cooperate”. It was not only controlled from the center through 
the appointment of local representatives, but also by political agendas. Despite the 
fact that the association was supposed to represent the will of the people and 
ultimately would even replace the Kwantung Army, around the mid-1930s its 
leadership was changed and it was made into an instrument of the army and 
government. Consequently, it started focusing more on surveillance and 
mobilization140.  
  Sovereignty With the rise of Chinese nationalism, the Manchukuo government 
enforced policies to claim sovereignty over the region. These varied by some degree 
of governmentality that was represented by detailed censuses and surveys, large scale 
and complex plans for settlements, attention to hygiene and welfare, the availability 
of education, drinking water, shelters, and the mobilization of the population for 
vaccination141. The Kwantung army and the regional power structure also forged 
alliances with local elites, redemptive societies, and the old power structure. 	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Although the allies had little choice given the reality of Japanese military power, it 
was also clear to the Japanese that some kind of autonomous status was necessary to 
maintain the alliance142.  
  One of the most important alliances the Manchukuo government forged was 
with the redemptive societies. These societies had been suppressed during the 
Northern expedition of the Chinese nationalists and by Chinese warlords. This 
presented the Japanese with a timely opportunity to gather support. Furthermore, the 
restoration of the imperial institution, which was represented by the installment of 
Emperor Puyi on the throne, seemed very important to most of the redemptive 
societies and thus served the Japanese cause143. Not only were these societies able to 
continue their work, but they also appeared stronger than they had ever been during 
the time of the Japanese occupation in Manchukuo144. This move by the Manchukuo 
government is fascinating, since redemptive societies in Japan in the 1930s were 
attacked. Their ideologies sometimes competed with sovereignty claims presented by 
the state and as such could be a force of anti-government resistance. Despite 
bureaucrats in the Manchukuo government expressing doubts, these societies were far 
too important for the political projects to be disregarded. Not only were they more 
effective in mobilizing people than civic organizations145, they were also believed to 
embody the Asiatic characteristic of agrarian communitarianism that represented the 
spirit of all national and ethnic groups in Asia146. The government believed that it 
could change the redemptive societies into departments that were engaged in welfare, 
enlightenment, and control of the people, while at the same time suppressing its 
“superstitious” nature147. By leaving this kind of organizations and power structure 
intact, and transforming them for their own benefit, the Manchukuo government 
could thus have a “traditional” kind of legitimacy. So just like the Soviet Union 	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allowed nationalism to gain support while remaining suspicious of it, the Japanese 
boosted the redemptive societies in Manchukuo.  
  Finally, faced with Chinese nationalist claims on the area, the Manchukuo 
government created doctrines to not only appeal to the ethnic minorities living there, 
but also in a way to convince themselves of their “rightfulness”. One of the ideas was 
the “kingly way” or odo. The kingly way was based on the classical Confucian idea 
of sage statesmanship. Imperial rule was thus assumed by the ruler as an intermediary 
between heaven and earth. The Japanese government used the kingly way to justify 
the restoration of the overthrown Qing emperor Puyi onto the Manchurian throne. 
The Japanese ministers of Puyi in the Manchukuo government would oversee the 
“realization of the Confucian ideal of the society of great unity” (daido), by claiming 
“to protect the livelihood of the people”. Accordingly, if enlightened absolutism was 
represented by the kingly way, feudal institutions of oppressions could be 
transformed into instruments of liberation148. In short, this represented the conviction 
that traditional ideas and practices could be used again and transformed to serve as a 
source of legitimacy. Bound to the kingly way was the idea of local self-government 
(jichi). “The ideal society of great unity” was only achieved when people lived by 
self-governance alone. When this phase was achieved, people would be living in a 
self-sufficient and self-regulating society. The monarch could withdraw from the 
government and would not be deemed necessary anymore. Nevertheless, when the 
people failed to achieve and preserve welfare, the government was needed to 
strengthen the powers of the local self-governing institutions149. By intentionally 
keeping the conditions of self-governance vague, the Manchukuo government had a 
permit to rule according to its wishes while at the same time claiming to have the 
interest of the people at heart.  
  The idea of racial harmony (minzoku kyowa) was used to further legitimize 
Japanese rule in Manchukuo. According to this racial harmony principle, “Chinese, 
Manchus, Mongols, Koreans and Japanese would cooperate as equal citizens in a 
self-governing unit”. Within this multiracial political structure, Chinese and Japanese 
would be able to “mix harmoniously into a single society, where human beings loved 	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one another, and which would bring to reality the ideal of coexistence and co-
prosperity” 150. This might be compared to the idea of fusion and Friendship of the 
Peoples propagated in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s. In the creation 
of the Manchukuo identity, Manchukuo state-builders did recognize the importance 
of identity formation for mobilization purposes and domestic and international 
sovereignty claims. However, they could not build a strong nationalist identity that 
either excluded the interest of Japan or compromised the colonial sense of superiority 
among Japanese in the region. Therefore the identity that they created was weakly 
territorial, expressed in the ethnic nationality framework, in Asian civilization forms, 
and in “the spatial representation of a frontier nation build around the forest”. In order 
to appeal to the Chinese population, the state allowed Asian civilizational forms like 
Confucianism and redemptive societies. On the other hand, the representation of 
Manchukuo as a natural frontier was meant to limit Chinese claims on the region and 
promote the Japanese as caretakers of the autochthonous peoples and their “primitive” 
culture. While different efforts were made to harmonize the contradictory 
conceptions of authenticity, the Manchukuo government seems to have juggled them 
most of the time151. 
    For example, although society in Manchukuo was heavily influenced by 
Chinese culture, and also was inhabited by a large population of Han-Chinese, the 
idea of harmony among the races required the state to reverse this process of 
“Sinicization” and to create “pure” races in order to enforce the program152. In the 
ethnic classification system, Japanese and Koreans represented the Southern Tangus; 
the Daurs, the Solons, the Yellow River Tangus, and Shandong peoples represented 
the Mongol Tangus; the Manchus, the Goldi represented the Manchurian Tangus; and 
the Oroqen represented the Siberian Tangus. This Tanguisic or Pan-North-Asian 
people theory was copied from the Ural-Altaic thesis that was popular in Russia and 
Europe in the 19th century. Customs, language and religious practices like shamanism 
were categorized into this theory of common racial origins. The theory could on the 	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one hand be used to legitimize Japanese rule by claiming it had roots in Northeast 
Asia, while at the same time it could claim its superiority153.  
  Like Duara shows in his research, the identity creation to limit Chinese claims 
while at the same time represent the Japanese as caretakers of the ethnic minorities, 
shows clearly in the case of the Oroquen tribe. The basic tribal strategy of the 
Manchukuo state was to isolate and concentrate them. The Oroquen, who had become 
agriculturist under Han influence, were moved from farmland and forbidden to 
practice agriculture and marriage with other people. This policy did not only isolate 
them, it also sought to return them to their “primitive” status154. Furthermore, the 
Oroquen were labeled and forced to live by an identity, even though the reality of 
their lives was dramatically different. In order to protect the border, the Manchukuo 
state forced the Oroquen to undergo two months of military training each. This 
training was carried out simultaneously with the hunting season and consequently led 
to a decline in their income. Ironically, these kinds of state intrusions took place at a 
time when the Manchukuo government claimed to “preserve their original culture”155.   
  Propaganda In order to spread ideas like the kingly way and racial harmony, 
propaganda such as leaflets and pamphlets, along with radio and movie broadcasts 
were extensively utilized156. During the celebration of foundation day for example, 
the media was used intensively in order to foster a Manchurian identity among the 
local people. There were performances of the national anthem, flag- and military 
parades. Honoring of the war dead was also conducted, however, only to 
commemorate the fallen Japanese soldiers157. Because the government in Manchukuo 
faced Chinese counterpropaganda produced by the Communists and Nationalists, it 
felt it needed to have a tight control over what kind of propaganda was to be 
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produced. Therefore, it was important to not propagate contradicting messages158. 
The Manchukuo state, however, did hardly any research on the effectiveness of the 
propaganda and discourses that the state produced among its target population159.  
Even if such surveys were conducted, government officials disregarded them as 
“unimportant”, and considered their own vision to be more valuable to the creation of 
policies and propaganda160. What perhaps illustrates this point the best, is the 
propaganda poster created for “miss Manchuria”. The girl in the poster was a 
Japanese girl, wearing traditional Chinese clothes, convincing her audience to be 
“Chinese”. Thus not even policy makers and the majority of the important positions 
in the government were filled by Japanese, even models for propaganda were 
Japanese. This shows the lack of dialogue between the ethnic minorities living in 
Manchuria when it comes to policies and ideas directly affecting them161.   
  Since policies and propaganda were created in isolation from the ethnic 
minorities, they show very low effectiveness rates. Propaganda that was spread 
among the population tended to be disorganized and dissatisfying. Most of the 
messages propagated were hard to follow for the civilian population, and worse, 
could be counter effective162. Posters and pamphlets contained weird sentences, often 
literally translated from Japanese to Chinese. Even though most of the people were 
illiterate, supposing that they could read, the message would simply not come across 
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anyway163. In addition, due to the poor behavior of the military, barbaric actions 
against the civilian population were not uncommon. Moreover, due to bureaucratic 
and racist arrogance, Japanese found it difficult to sympathize, or even empathize, 
with the Asians they claimed to liberate164. The result was an indigenous society that 
saw no reason to support and fight for the Japanese. Since there was no widespread 
sense of identification with the Manchukuo state, the army faced difficulties when 
they tried to mobilize troops with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The 
non-Japanese population saw no need to defend “a country” that had plunged them 
into a war in the first place165.  
  Even though there was such a strong split between “reality” and the policies 
the Manchukuo government preached and implemented with regards to the 
indigenous population, this “reality” was in a sense irrelevant. The Japanese 
measured the value of their actions by the attempt itself. By telling themselves that 
they were working for the good of the Chinese masses, even the most progressive 
Japanese had trouble in seeing that the benefits of the colonial progress in 
Manchukuo were mainly enjoyed by themselves166.  
3.2 1937 Onwards 
 Generally we can see three periods of governance in the Manchukuo state 
between 1931-1945. In 1931-1936, the Guangdong Army was relatively receptive to 
the Japanese utopian and visionary groups based in Manchuria. This does not mean 
that there was no establishment of Japanese dominance, but rather that there was an 
independence of Manchukuo from Japanese government interference and Zaibatsu167 
capitalists. From the mid-1930s, bureaucrats from Japan arrived in Manchukuo to 	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increase their influence, and by 1936 the government announced the first series of 
five-year plans. These were extensive state control plans to build up the industry and 
commerce that was needed in the increasingly hostile and warlike world168. Within 
this time frame, perhaps the largest shifts in policies came with the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese war in 1937. As the war intensified, the Manchukuo regime became 
ever more committed to mobilizing the population, regardless of ethnicity, for its 
political, economic, and ideological projects169. This move was necessary since even 
though Japan brought under control most of China’s major cities, industry, 
international trade, and productive farmland, it was never able to quell resistance that 
was mostly represented by Chinese Nationalists and Communists. China became a 
region that consumed large amounts of Japan’s military resources 170. With this kind 
of mobilization and reliance on the non-Japanese population in Manchuria, it became 
more and more difficult for the Japanese to express “vulgar racism”171.  
  Despite the trend towards inclusionary racism and reliance on the non-
Japanese population in Manchukuo, where one would expect a closer compliance by 
the government to their ideology of the kingly way and racial harmony, the opposite 
happened. Official events focused more on superiority of the Japanese culture and 
less on Manchu identity172. Emperor Puyi, who was initially considered equal to the 
Japanese emperor, became increasingly subordinated. He worshipped at the holy 
shrines of Ise, and in 1939 a shrine for Ameterasu173 was installed in his palace. In 
1940, Puyi underwent a ritual rebirth from the womb of Ameterasu that made him the 	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younger half brother of the Japanese emperor174.  Nevertheless, whereas the idea of 
racial harmony stressed the common roots the Japanese had with the people living in 
Northeast Asia and therefore their claim on sovereignty in the region, the rebirth of 
emperor Puyi as a half brother also signified the inclusion of the “non-Japanese” in 
the Japanese “bloodline”. People in Manchukuo now represented Japan’s 
subpopulation. This act is consistent with the inclusionary policies of the post-1937 
period throughout the empire175.   
  Like Fujitani shows, with the wartime conditions changing around the Empire, 
not only in Korea but also in Manchukuo the population was targeted as human 
beings, in which acts of governmentality sought to make people healthy, reproductive 
and long lived 176. Health became a key issue in the government line, since the 
likeliness of war increased in 1935. In every city free clinics were established. 
Through sport events, the government hoped not only to improve health, but also to 
foster a “Manchukuo identity” among the people. This was an important step, since in 
1938 military service became obligatory177. From April 1937 onwards, the Concordia 
Youth League started compulsorily mobilization of all youths aged sixteen to 
nineteen178. There were also forces working for autonomy within the power structure 
in Manchukuo. The Kwantung army attacked special rights for Japanese, like in 1936 
when extraterritorial rights and a series of privileges were abolished179. Nevertheless, 
this did not mean Japanese and non-Japanese faced equal measures from that point 
onwards, nor does it mean that violence against the population disappeared180. What 
is more, although Japanese privileges were abandoned, this gesture pales in 
comparison to the growing subordination of Manchukuo to the expanding Japanese 	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war machine181. With the war and the increase in industrial production, inflation and 
taxes began to burden people. Especially after the outbreak in the Pacific War in 1941, 
living standards were extremely reduced, particularly among the Chinese population. 
In 1939 for every 100 yuan a Japanese earned, a Chinese worker only made 29 
yuan.182 In military school where Japanese consumed rice, Chinese ate sorghum183.   
  The Concordia Association also became increasingly involved in the war 
efforts. During the forties its most important function was to encourage unrealistic 
increases in factory production while making sure that the workers did not rebel 
under the harsh conditions184. Religious and redemptive societies were also used for 
this goal. However, the societies showed little comprehension of the goals of the 
mobilization campaign and therefore refused to cooperate. Subsequently the 
authorities planned to change the format and use seminars and lectures to teach the 
activists of the redemptive societies. During the war years, the regime depended on 
balancing support from redemptive societies and cooperatives, while developing 
industrialization projects that where in line with its state-building goals185. When 
Japan’s iron grip on the country grew stronger, Chinese “collaborators” grew hostile 
towards the Japanese. Many started to express their loyalty to China and complained 
that they were being kept in office by force. Manchurian soldiers were first happy to 
be reorganized into the Manchukuo army due to their inclusion in the state, but grew 
hostile when they had to fight against the Chinese. They expressed their 
dissatisfaction by defecting weapons or passing them on to the Chinese. Chinese 
businessmen, bankers, teachers and doctors living in Manchukuo were unified in their 
dislike of the Manchukuo government186.  
   Despite the growing hostility towards the Manchukuo government, support of 
the non-Japanese population remained crucial to the Manchukuo state. Nevertheless, 
the state also viewed them with suspicion and caution. From 1939, all Koreans who 	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wanted to immigrate to Manchuria had to demonstrate their political purity187, and 
groups that refused to follow the official government line were dissolved188. This was 
not without reason since after 1933 the Soviet Union supported Chinese Communist 
attacks against the Japanese. In the Korean-dominated Jiandao, communist-led 
uprising were brutally suppressed. Whole villages were wiped out, including the 
killing of 2500 villagers in the Pingtingshan massacre. The Japanese government 
allowed germ warfare experimentation in Manchuria and elsewhere in China. In 
Harbin located unit 731, 3000 people died between 1937 and 1945189. It is important 
to remember that the dual approach of some sort of form of governmentality, as well 
as the elaborately planned isolation of peasants in hamlets, the cold-blooded science 
of human experimentation with lethal bacteria, and the mobilization of the population 
for a deadly war, were expressed by most modern nondemocratic regimes of the 
inter-war years. This duality was also expressed by fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and 
the Stalinist Soviet Union190. Nonetheless, the contradiction between sovereignty 
claims by the Manchukuo state and the imperialist power structure became more and 
more intolerable over the war years. This was especially evident with the outbreak of 
the Pacific war, as the entire enterprise started to fall apart191. Manchukuo ended “as a 
strong-military fascist-state that represented only itself”192.  
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                                    4. Conclusion 
	  	   The Soviet Union and the Manchukuo state were constructed as nation-states, 
in which developmental, modernization, and industrial programs were enforced. The 
question Duara rightfully asks is whether such forms of state building and 
governmentality could develop without referring to the identities and the loyalties of 
its citizens193. Not to mention the pressure of internal and external forms of 
nationalist movements, and the idea of national self-determination. As the previous 
chapters have shown, the way the Soviet Union and the Manchukuo state dealt with 
ethnic groups, and the way they subsequently enforced policies, were to a great deal 
dependent on the domestic and/or international “crisis” in which they were created. It 
was also “crisis” that would enforce revision on their ethnic policies years later.  
  The Manchukuo state and the Soviet Union went in almost opposite directions 
when it comes to the way they handled their ethnic population. The Soviet Union was 
the result of years of Civil War. Not only Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik forces 
combated each other. Different groups around the Russian Empire, who were 
influenced by ideas of national self- determination, also started to rethink their 
relation towards the Kremlin. In order for the Bolsheviks to preserve the territorial 
integrity of the previous regime, they adopted the slogan of national self-
determination. This was to recruit ethnic support for the revolution. Naturally, when 
the Soviet Union was created in 1922, the Soviet government had to secure the 
national identities of their ethnic minority population as well as to suppress Russian 
nationalism in order not to inflame anti-Russian sentiments. Only then could the 
Soviet Union claim sovereignty over these groups of people. The Soviet government 
put considerable resources into the promotion of national self-consciousness of its 
non-Russian population, even though this meant that they had to betray the Marxist-
Leninist ideology that stated that nationalism was a “bourgeois trick”.  
   Unrest, anxiety, the prospect of war, and the inability of the Soviet 
government to live up its revolutionary promises marked the 1930s. Local 
nationalism prevented the path to a unitary state and society, emigration movements 
rejected the Soviet fatherland, and border regions resisted strongly to collectivization. 
The split between revolutionary utopia and reality was significant. Stalin was 	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convinced that Russian and Russification were more reliable ways of establishing 
authority. The Russian nationality was revived, and Russian culture and language 
were used to emphasize the unifying core of the Soviet Union. Subsequently this gave 
Russian culture a privileged status. Nevertheless, despite the revision of the 
nationality policy, the national identity among the ethnic minorities kept on being 
promoted. Bilingualism or biculturalism was the goal at most.  
  Alternatively, Manchukuo presents us with a totally different image. During 
the 1920s, Japan had already become a major economic and military power in the 
Manchurian region. However, economic competition and sovereignty claims over the 
region presented by the Chinese, and the transformation of the political system in 
Japan due to domestic social and global economic crisis, changed Japan’s approach 
towards Manchuria. Together with the perceived problem of a surplus rural 
population, and the superior feeling amongst Japanese towards their Asian 
counterparts, the Japanese government could justify its territorial conquest of 
Manchuria. Manchukuo was founded in 1932 as an independent multi-ethnic nation. 
This was to fend of claims by the Chinese, to seek recognition by the League of 
Nations, and to give consideration to the discourse of pan-Asian liberation, anti-
Western imperialism, and right to self-determination. The threat to the sovereignty of 
the Manchukuo state was mostly external and presented by Chinese Communists and 
Nationalists and to some degree the Soviet Union, as in 1933 all internal resistance 
groups were suppressed. After all, Manchukuo was integrated into the Japanese 
Empire by force, and consequently no great concessions had to be made toward the 
non-Japanese population to claim sovereignty.  
  In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Manchukuo state subsequently 
constructed an identity rather than giving acknowledgment to an identity that already 
existed. Notably since Manchuria was mostly populated by Han-Chinese, 
Manchurian nationalism hardly existed. Although the forged “Manchurian” identity 
was claimed to represent equality among the different ethnicities, Manchukuo state-
builders could not build a strong nationalist identity that either excluded the interest 
of Japan or compromised the colonial sense of superiority among the Japanese in the 
region. Consequently, the forged identity was weakly territorial and sought to appeal 
to the Chinese on the one hand, while limiting Chinese claims on the region on the 
other. Needless to say, such a constructed identity did not gain much following 
among the non-Japanese population. This is especially evident when one considers 
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the discriminatory policies and institutions such as cooperative farms, the tribal 
policy towards the Oroquen, and the barbaric actions against the civilian population. 
  With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the Manchukuo state was 
forced to mobilize their population regardless of ethnicity. Such kind of mobilization 
for war could not take place without downplay of vulgar racism, and the inclusion of 
the non-Japanese as Japan’s sub-population. Governmentality, such as the 
establishment of free clinics, sought to make people healthy, reproductive, and long 
lived. Extraterritorial rights and privileges for Japanese were abandoned. Whereas 
mobilization for the war meant a more inclusionary policy towards its non-Japanese 
population, alternatively, it was also the ongoing war that made sure these people 
kept on being exploited and violated.  
  Despite the fact that the differences between Manchukuo and the Soviet 
Union are obvious, it is also possible to draw some parallels between the two. Both 
governments made concessions in the sense of what worked, rather than what was 
ideologically the “right thing to do”. In order to concentrate on goals like 
industrialization, modernization as well as sovereignty claims, both countries 
encouraged policies that went against their fundamental beliefs. The Soviet Union 
encouraged nationalism; alternatively, the Manchukuo state supported the redemptive 
societies for mobilization purposes, even though these societies were suppressed in 
Japan. The Soviet Union and Manchukuo government were both suspicious of 
nationalism and the redemptive societies respectively, since they could offer forms of 
anti-government resistance. Nationalism and the redemptive societies were boosted 
by the argument that under state supervision their nature could be changed. The 
Manchukuo government believed that it could suppress its superstitious nature while 
change the redemptive societies into departments engaged in welfare, enlightenment, 
and control of the people. Alternatively, the Soviet government hoped that by 
granting people forms of nationhood, it could split above-class alliances for statehood. 
But the Manchukuo state might have gone even one step further. In the Concordia 
Association, it borrowed ideas of their ideological competitor, the Soviet Union. The 
association saw itself as a nation in fashion of the Soviet Union of nationalities, by 
giving “people and nationalities rights under a state structure”. 
  When it comes to the status quo of the dominant ethnic group, the Russians 
and Japanese, we can also see some similarities. Even during the 1920s, when the 
Russians suppressed their nationality, most influential positions were reserved within 
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the republic for Russians. Likewise, in the Manchukuo government the Japanese took 
up all the important positions. The Soviet government made a distinction between 
eastern and western nationalities, in which the Russians were part of the western 
“advanced” nationalities. Similarly, the Manchurian identity and the sovereignty 
claims made by the Japanese were based on their superior nature. In the 1930s, 
characterized by the Friendship of the Peoples, Russian culture was considered to be 
the most “progressive” culture and serve as a model for other Soviet nationalities. On 
the other hand, the Japanese were supposed to be model subjects capable of leading 
the colonization process in Manchuria. Their “material and mental” capacities would 
set an example to the indigenous people to leave a stable and healthy life.  
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